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Abstract 
The integrity of the gas distribution network is crucial to guarantee the safety of human beings and 
the environment, while avoiding significant financial outlay. Since gas plants are progressively 
increasing near urban areas, a comprehensive tool to conduct maintenance and reduce the risk arising 
from the operations is required. To this end risk mitigation strategies have played a pivotal role during 
the last decades. In this paper, a comparison of three Risk-Based Maintenance (RBM) methodologies 
able to point out the most critical components, is presented. The first developed technique is a four 
stages Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), characterized by a Hierarchical Bayesian Network 
(HBN) to perform the occurrence analysis and a Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) to assess the magnitude of the adverse outcomes. The HBN is adopted to overcome the 
limitations of traditional probability analysis approaches such as Fault Tree (FT), Event Tree (ET) or 
Bow-Tie (BT). To define a risk metric the total cost of failure is estimated and subsequently the Cost 
Risk Priority Number (CRPN) is calculated for each equipment. The second approach is a 
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) carried out via a software named Safeti (by Den Norske Veritas – 
German Lloyds DNV-GL). By exploiting standard frequencies and modelling the losses of 
containment through Safeti, the most compelling devices are determined based on their estimated risk 
integral percentage. At last, Synergi Plant (another software developed by DNV-GL) is adopted for 
the third methodology. The software provides a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) plan, through which the 
components are ranked. The proposed study can provide asset manager a concrete aid to focus 
maintenance efforts on priority apparatus, while assisting them in adopting the most appropriate 
methodology to their context. To demonstrate the applicability of the approaches and compare the 
obtained rankings, a Natural Gas Regulating and Measuring Station (NGRMS) is considered as case 
of study. The results proofed that all the proposed approaches can be implemented for practical 
application and the choice of the method strongly depends on the available data. 
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During the past years the demand of natural gas has progressively increased, leading to an expansion 
of the gas distribution network [1]. Since gas installations are scattered across the land, they are 
constantly threatening the safety of civilians, properties and the environment [2], indeed accidents in 
transmission pipelines have recently caused losses of life and immoderate damages all over the world 
[3, 4]. Thus, the evaluation of the risk and the subsequent implementation of preventive measures are 
fundamental to avoid potential failures and hazardous outcomes.  
All the devices are exposed to various deterioration sources such as environmental factors, aging or 
third-party interference. To preserve the integrity of the equipment adequate maintenance and repair 
actions must be performed. In chemical industries, dangerous phenomena are indeed mainly 
generated by asset failures [5], therefore adopting proper maintenance strategies allows to increase 
the reliability, while reducing the impact of unexpected breakdowns [6].  
Over the last decades, maintenance has undergone a severe mutation, moving from a corrective to a 
proactive or predictive approach. The Corrective Maintenance (CM) is characterized by the lowest 
engineering contributions since it acts after a failure has occurred. CM used to be the most common 
practice when maintenance was seen as a necessary evil because of its consumption of resources and 
manpower, however due to the increase of the safety and reliability requirements, Preventive 
Maintenance (PM) has acquired a pivotal role. Besides maintenance started to be considered as a vital 
tool to achieve enterprises’ objectives along with pursuing a long-term profitability [7]. The first PM 
techniques to be introduced were time-based (i.e. based on service age), nevertheless the real 
operating condition of the equipment is not considered by these strategies, leading to a waste of useful 
life and higher expenses. To overcome this limitation new maintenance policies such as Condition-
Based Maintenance (CBM) have been introduced. Thanks to the advancement of technology, 
especially in sensing and monitoring devices, CBM has indeed gained much attention over the last 
years [8]. While time-based PM schedules maintenance actions at fixed time-intervals, CBM reacts 
based on available information regarding the condition of a given component [9]. Due to its 
advantages many researchers have recently focused on CBM application to several fields [10-14]. 
Kang et al. [11] presented a CBM methodology applied to an offshore wind turbine, exploiting 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) as core tool to determine whether a device requires maintenance 
work. Results proofed that the developed methodology reduce the costs up to 32,5% compared to a 
traditional periodic maintenance.  
Despite its demonstrated benefits, CBM conceals some downsides. Tailor-made instrumentation, set-
up costs and specific skills are indeed required by any CBM policy [15], moreover data used for 
failure rate estimation are often scarce. To solve the last issue CBM has been incorporated with RBM 
[16, 17]. RBM approaches aim at minimizing the probability of system failure, while mitigating its 
consequences by integrating maintenance activities with safety issues [18]. Thus, RBM plans lead to 
concentrate maintenance efforts on components associated with high risk, which are inspected and 
maintained more frequently than low-risk devices [19, 20]. Since the early 2000s RBM has gained 
popularity both for offshore [21-24] and onshore [25-28]  applications. Yeter et al. [24] developed a 
framework to define the optimum number of monopile wind turbines in an offshore wind farm by 
minimising the total life cycle cost per energy produced. Different designs were indagated 
considering capital expenditure, operative expenditure, decommissioning expenditure and a 
relationship between the manufacturing cost and the structural safety. This work revealed that 60 
installations guarantee the optimum life cycle cost per energy produced, while high-quality 
inspections for fewer wind turbines and low-quality inspections for more wind turbines are suggested 
during the first visits and the last visits respectively.  
Although the risk arising from the operations can never be eliminated, an effective RBM policy can 
bring the overall risk under a tolerable threshold level, by decreasing the likelihood of accidents. To 
this end many works were presented during the past years [29-32] . The study developed by Khan 
and Haddara [31] proposes a RBM strategy for designing the optimum maintenance plan via a reverse 
FT analysis. The five most critical units of an ethylene production plant were considered and for each 
detected failure scenarios the overall risk is calculated. The results regarded the ethylene 
transportation pipeline as the most critical group since both the individual and societal risks exceeded 
the acceptable risk criteria. A more recent research by Pui et al. [30] proposes a similar method for 
an offshore pressure drilling, adopting a Bayesian Network (BN) instead of a FT. By setting the 
lowest risk level the posterior probabilities are found and they are used to estimate the maintenance 
interval for each critical device.  
Compared to other traditional techniques, the BN is more suited for reasoning under uncertainty, 
especially when data sources are limited [33]. Besides conventional tools are static [34] and unable 
to represent conditional dependencies [35]. The recent development in open source Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCOC) sampling software i.e. OpenBUGS have led to a wider adoption of HBN for 
engineering applications [36]. HBN has indeed been exploited by many researchers to perform PRA 
[37, 38], condition monitoring [39, 40] and reliability assessment [41, 42]. Very recently, 
BahooToroody et al. [39]  adopted a HBN integrated with a generalized linear model for studying the 
trend of the process variables of a NGRMS. The developed methodology evaluates the reliability of 
the system in real time, assisting the users during the remediation program. A previous work by 
BahooToroody et al. [41] presented a comparison between a Bayesian inference with hierarchical 
structure and maximum likelihood estimation in estimating the failure rate of operating devices, while 
considering time-dependency. The results depicted that HBN model is more accurate than the 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
Choosing the proper maintenance policy is regarded as a difficult task and it depends on the 
maintenance skills and equipment available inside a given organization [43], moreover enterprises 
work with finite resources, hence maintenance should be cost effective. Since Oil & Gas industry is 
classified as a high-risk field due to the handled hazardous substance, maintenance strategies must 
also include safety aspects. Thus, determining the most critical devices is essential to guarantee the 
safety, while staying within the budget. Despite all the ongoing efforts on asset integrity management 
of the natural gas distribution system there is still space for a comprehensive review of RBM 
methodologies. Consequently, the main objective of this paper is comparing three RBM approaches 
that provide a criticality ranking and prioritize maintenance actions for the devices operating inside a 
NGRMS. In the first method a HBM analysis is implemented to deal with the uncertainties arising 
from the process and predict the posterior probabilities of failure, while the severity is assessed via a 
FMECA. The second and the third approaches are respectively a QRA conducted via Safeti and a 
RBI performed via Synergi Plant. The models are applied to an actual example of stochastic process 
of a NGRMS near Florence, Italy. 
1.1 Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling 
“Data” collected by a process or other sources (i.e. database or literature) represent the starting point 
of almost every statistical inference. First evaluating, manipulating and organizing “Data” lead to 
“Information”, then “Knowledge” is acquired by gathering “Information”. At last drawing a 
conclusion based on the available “Information” is regarded as “Inference” [44]. HBN is defined as 
an advanced tool to conduct inference based on real world observations, by using the Bayes’ theorem, 




                                                                                                                                  (1) 
the Bayes’ theorem allows to calculate the posterior distribution of the unknown parameter of interest 
𝜃. 𝜋0(𝜃) is addressed as the prior distribution of 𝜃 , while the posterior distribution is indicated by 
𝜋1(𝜃|𝑥). Finally, 𝑓(𝑥|𝜃) is called the likelihood function. The Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling 
exploits a multistage prior distribution, that can be estimated by Eq. 2. [42, 44]. 
𝜋0(𝜃) = ∫ 𝜋1(𝜃|𝜑)𝜋2(𝜑)𝑑𝜑∅                                                                                                                               (2) 
where 𝜋2(𝜑) represents the hyper-prior distribution, which considers the uncertainty of 𝜑. The first 
stage prior is denoted by 𝜋1(𝜃|𝜑) and it represents the population variability in 𝜃 for a given value 
of 𝜑, which is often a vector whose components are named hyper-parameters. 
1.2 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
As reported by Jafari et al. [47] a classic QRA is characterized by four main steps: I) hazard 
identification and scenario selection, II) frequency estimation, III) consequence analysis and IV) risk 
estimation. During the first phase the harmful events along with the related hazards and threats are 
identified (I), then the frequencies of the selected accidents are found, usually adopting FT analysis 
(II). Subsequently consequence analysis is carried out to determine the effect of the chosen scenario 
(III) and finally the risk arising from the hazardous events is estimated (IV). To evaluate the 
consequences and perform the subsequent risk assessment, source models, dispersion models, 
consequence models and damage models are required (Fig. 1) 
 
Fig. 1. Models adopted during a QRA and their relationships  
The source models calculate the amount of the hazardous substance released along with defining its 
phase, while the dispersion models are tasked with estimating the concentration of the released mass 
both in time and space. Depending on the features of the hazardous material and its phase, the 
consequence models determine the impact of the phenomena (i.e. jet fire, pool fire, vapor cloud 
explosion, flash fire, fireball) caused by the loss of containment. At last, the damage models assess 
the risk based on a chosen metric. (e.g. probability of death). 
Implementing a quantitative risk is considered a difficult task that is usually performed through 
specific softwares such as Phast & Safeti [48], which adopts standard source, dispersion and 
consequence models to carry out the QRA. The several benefits possessed by Safeti, resulted in a 
widespread use of the software for complex engineering applications. Examples include  risk analysis 
of supercritical fluid extraction [49], simulation of an explosion [50-52], and leakage of hazardous 
substance [53]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 illustrates the stages and steps of the 
developed methodology. Section 3 describes the implementation of the methodologies to a case study, 
while section 4 presents the discussion of the results. At last in section 5 conclusions are drawn. 
2. Developed methodology 
This paper aims at comparing three practical RBM approaches capable of prioritizing maintenance 
actions for hazardous plants. The strengths and weaknesses of each framework are highlighted 
through a sensitivity analysis, which also points out the best combination of the three methodologies. 
The outcome of this research will assist maintenance managers during the development of the 
maintenance plan, by guiding the choice of the methodology that best fits their needs. 
2.1 Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling and CRPN 
The first technique has been recently developed by Leoni et al. [54] and it consists of four stages as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Developed RBM framework methodology with hierarchical Bayesian inference 
The first phase is accounted as data collection (Stage 1), therefore data to implement the subsequent 
steps are gathered. The system is broken down into its main components, then for each component 
the number of failures that has occurred during a specific timeframe is found. 
During the probability analysis (Stage 2.) a HBM is implemented through a script in OpenBugs. Via 
HBM a binomial function is specified and the posterior distributions of the probability of failure are 
estimated. Subsequently for each distribution the mean value is extracted. The mean posterior 
probabilities of failure are eventually exploited to classify the devices into ten occurrence categories.  
Next a FMECA is adopted to conduct the severity analysis (Stage 3). During this stage the outcomes 
of potential failures are evaluated and then used to assign to each component a level of severity. As 
in the previous work ten severity classes are considered for this study. 
At last data about costs are provided by expert judgments and useful information. Through a 
combination of cost, occurrence and severity the CRPN is calculated for each component and the risk 
analysis (Stage 4) is implemented. The CRPN is indeed used for ranking the components, pointing 
out the most critical ones.   
2.2 Quantitative Risk Analysis with Safeti 
The second approach is a QRA carried out via a software named Safeti. The flowchart of this method 
is represented in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Developed RBM framework merhodology with Safeti 
As in the previous framework, the first step consists in defining the system and breaking it down into 
its most relevant components. Each component is then studied to determine its features (i.e. operating 
conditions and dimensions) and the handled hazardous substances. Next reference scenarios are 
assigned to every device that can be modelled by the software and subsequently for each chosen 
reference scenario standard frequencies are found in literature. At last ETs are developed for the 
reference scenarios. The inputs that are inherently related to the plant are provided by this part of the 
approach (Stage 1).  
During the second phase (Stage 2.) the information, that are not directly related to the plant, are 
procured. At first weather parameters such as Pasquill Stability and windspeed, required by the 
dispersion models, are gathered. Then population density and harm criteria, which are crucial for 
estimating the risk of each scenario, are determined.  
All the inputs collected by the previous stages are inserted into Safeti to perform the QRA (Stage 3). 
The components are finally ranked based on the risk integral percentage obtained by the calculation. 
The risk integral percentage of a certain equipment is estimated by summing up the risk integral 
percentage of the scenarios related to that equipment.  
2.3 Risk-Based Inspection with Synergi Plant 
The sequence of the proposed methodology is showed by Fig. 4. The main tool adopted for the third 
approach is Synergi Plant, which is a software developed by DNV-GL for scheduling inspections 
based on the level of risk.   
 
Fig. 4. Developed RBM framework methodology with Synergi Plant 
During the first phase (Stage 1) the system is initially decomposed into its main components, then 
each device that can be modelled by the software is investigated to collect data about its relevant 
parameters such as operating condition, material or wall thickness. Next corrosion allowance and cost 
data are provided to perform the analysis.  
As in every RBI a risk metric and a risk target are defined, indeed the inspection is scheduled when 
a fixed risk threshold is reached. Besides a parameter that can be monitored continuously or inspected 
periodically and that is related to the risk driver is chosen, as long with its damage mechanism. To 
conclude this part (Stage 2) a current and a future evaluation dates are set.  
The risk analysis (Stage 3) is finally carried out via Synergi Plant. The most critical components are 
pinpointed based on two relevant parameters: i) the inspection date and ii) the Future Risk Total Cost 
(FRTC) without performing inspection. 
3. Application of the methodologies: a case study 
To illustrate the application of the proposed approaches, NGRMS (Fig. 5.) is chosen as a case of 
study. NGRMS is indeed deemed as a hazardous installation since toxic and flammable substances 
are processed. Each plant has twelve main components divided into four groups as listed in Table 1. 
 
Fig. 5. Schematic architecture of a typical NGRMS 
Table 1 
Main groups and components of NGRMS 
Group   Component 
Reduction   Pressure regulator 
    Pilot 
    Filter 
Measuring   Pressure and temperature gauge 
    Calculator 
    Meter 
    Remote control system 
Odorization   THT tank 
    THT pipelines 
Preheating   Pump 
    Boiler 
    Water pipe 
 
The pressure regulator is designed to reduce the pressure of the gas flow by varying the cross-sectional 
flow area. For faster and more precise change of the pressure the pilot is also involved. Pressure 
regulator and pilot are tasked with adapting the pressure of the gas flow to the downstream utilities. 
The filter is placed upstream the pressure regulator, indeed it has to block the access of solid and 
liquid impurities that could damage the subsequent devices. Before entering inside the pressure 
regulator the gas temperature is increased by an exchanger in which circulated pre-heated water. This 
process is required to avoid the formation of ice since the temperature decreases along with the 
reduction of pressure. The most relevant parameters of the gas flow are assessed by the measuring 
group, while a precise quantity of odorizer, usually tetrahydrothiophene (THT), is added by the 
odorization group. 
3.1 Application of CRPN method to NGRMS 
First data regarding the number of failures and statistical population (Table 2) of each component are 
acquired. The considered data result from the operation of 59 NGRMSs during the past 6 years. 
Exploiting the aforementioned values and considering the relationships among the components a 
HBM was developed. To this end a binomial distribution was chosen to model the probability of 
failure, while a beta function was adopted as the prior distribution. The developed BN is showed by 
Fig. 6, where X denotes the number of failures and n stands for the population number. p is the 
unknown parameter of interest (i.e. the probability of failure) whose posterior distribution is provided 
by the HBM. At last 𝛼 and 𝛽 represent the hyper-parameters.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Adopted BN to estimate the posterior probabilities of failure 
Following the previous research the model was implemented through OpenBUGS software adopting 
a Jeffrey Prior, dbeta (0.5, 0.5), and three Markov Chain, each of which with 105 iterations. The 
Bayesian inference predicted the posterior distribution from which the mean values listed in Table 2 
are extracted. 
Table 2 
Number of failures, population number and posterior mean probability of failure of NGRMS’ main components 
Component Number of 
failures (x) 




 Posterior mean probability of 
failure 
Pressure Regulator 17  248   543,120  3.46E-05 
Pilots 6  496   1,086,240  1.29E-05 
Filter 12  124   271,560  5.36E-05 
RCS 19  59   129,210  1.52E-04 
Meter 7  108   236,520  4.23E-05 
PTG 65  59   129,210  5.09E-04 
Calculator 47  59   129,210  1.61E-04 
THT tank 7  59   129,210  6.80E-05 
THT pipelines 3  59   129,210  3.57E-05 
Pump 38  108   236,520  1.69E-04 
Boiler 23  108   236,520  1.07E-04 
Water pipe 25  59   129,210  2.07E-04 
 
Considering the results depicted by the calculation (Table 2) a level of occurrence is assigned to every 
component based on Table 3. Subsequently to perform the severity analysis the consequences of 
potential failure are evaluated via FMECA and each component is then inserted into Table 4. 
Table 3 
Likelihood criteria ranking 
Occurrence  
Occurrence 
probability   Component 
1   <1 in 30,000   Pilot 
2   1 in 25,000   Pressure regulator, THT pipelines 
3   1 in 20,000   Meter 
4   1 in 10,000   Filter, THT tank 
5   1 in 5,000   RCS, calculator, boiler, pump 
6   1 in 3,000   Water pipe 
7   1 in 2,000     
8   1 in 1,000   PTG 
9   1 in 500     
10   1 in 20     
 
Table 4 
Severity criteria ranking 
Severity   Severity of effect   Component 
1  No effect   
2  Very minor effect on production  Water pipe, PTG 
3  Minor effect on production  
Pump, meter, 
calculator 
4  Small effect on production, repair not required   
5  Moderate effect on production, repair required  Boiler 
6  Component performance is degraded  RCS 
7  The component is severely affected, NGRMS may not operate  Filter 
8  The component is inoperable with loss of primary function  
Pilot, pressure 
regulator 
9  Failure involves hazardous outcomes  
THT tank, THT 
pipelines 
10   
Failure is hazardous and occurs without warning, NGRMS operation is 
suspended     
 
Introducing the total cost of failure (C) the CRPN is finally calculated using Eq.  
𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝐶 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑂 
Where O and S are integer given by Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. O represents the level of 
occurrence, while S refers to the severity class. C denotes the dimensionless cost obtained through 
the estimated pump failure cost of 10,000$. Pump is the component characterized by the lowest total 
failure cost, while the failure of the odorization devices turned out to be the most expensive. Through 
the calculation of CRPN via Eq, the components are eventually ranked based on their criticality 
(Table 5).  
Table 5 
Obtained ranking through the CRPN methodology 
Ranking   Component   O   S   Dimensionless Cost (C)    CRPN 
1   THT tank   4   9   33   1188 
2   THT pipelines   2   9   33   594 
3   RCS   5   6   6   180 
4   Boiler   5   5   5   125 
5   Water pipe   8   2   7   112 
6   Meter   3   3   10   90 
7   Pressure 
Regulator 
  2   8   4   64 
8   Filter   4   7   2   56 
9   Pilot   1   8   4   32 
10   Calculator   5   3   2   30 
11   PTG   6   2   2   24 
12   Pump   5   3   1   15 
 
With a CRPN equal to 1188 the THT tank is regarded as the most critical device, followed by the 
THT pipeline. Their CRPNs arise mainly from the severity level (9), indeed potential leakage can 
plague the air of a vast area as well as causing dangerous phenomena such as pool fire or explosions. 
It transpires that the main maintenance efforts must be directed towards the odorization group to avoid 
financial losses. The third and the fourth highest CRPNs are associated to the RCS and the boiler 
respectively, but in contrast with the aforementioned equipment, the occurrence plays a relevant role. 
On the other side the pilot, the calculator, the PTG and the pump are evaluated as the least critical 
equipment, since their CRPNs are lower than 40.  
3.2 Application of QRA via Safeti to NGRMS 
Safeti is a professional simulator for consequence modelling and it is regarded as one of the most 
precise and accurate tools for implementing QRA of plants that process hazardous substances. An in-
depth knowledge of the process, the plant layout, the involved equipment, the handled hazardous 
substances, the geographical location, the weather conditions and the population surrounding the 
hazardous installation is required by any QRA.  
Water, methane and THT are processed by the components of a NGRMS. Both natural gas and 
odorization gas are deemed as hazardous substances due to their toxic and flammable properties and 
they are respectively handled by the reduction unit and the odorization group, while the devices 
belonging to the pre-heating group are tasked with the water treatments. The components considered 
during this approach are listed by Table 6, which also reports relevant information for the analysis. 
Table 6 
Operating condition, features, handled hazardous substance and its features of the considered NGRMS’ devices 
Equipment   
Size inlet 
diameter 
[mm]   
Service 
pressure 
range [bar]    
Service 
temperature 
range[°C]   
Substance 







regulator   101.6 mm   24-4.5   0-30    Methane    Gas    2000 
Filter   101.6mm   24   0-30    Methane    Gas    2000 
THT 
pipelines   50.8 mm   4.5   0-30    THT   Gas    200 
Pump   50.8mm    1.013   0-100   Water    Liquid    10 
Boiler   50.8mm    0.02   0-100   Water    Liquid    10 
Water pipe   50.8mm   1.013   0-100   Water    Liquid    10 
 
In addition to the equipment outlined by Table, the THT tank has also been taken into account for the 
QRA. The odorizer is indeed stored inside a horizontal cylindrical tank, which can contain up to 1,000 
litres of gas. On the other side the pilot and the measurement devices cannot be modelled by Safeti 
due to the absence of similar apparatus inside the software. 
After a brief analysis of the plant, the fault scenarios are investigated. In any QRA a hazardous event 
is represented by a loss of containment of a hazardous substance. Since resources are limited, a 
reduced number of scenarios (Table 7) is chosen. The frequencies of the considered reference 
scenarios are acquired through expert judgment and available literature [55, 56]. 
Table 7 
Selected reference scenarios and their respective frequencies  
Component   
Scenario 





  1   10mm leakage   1.2E-04 
  2   25mm leakage   1.1E-05 
  3   50mm leakage   1.1E-05 
  4   Catastrophic rupture   3.2E-06 
Filter 
  5   10mm leakage   8.9E-05 
  6   50mm leakage   6.4E-06 
  7   Catastrophic rupture   1.3E-07 
THT tank 
  8   10mm leakage   1.2E-04 
  9   25mm leakage   1.1E-05 
  10   50mm leakage   1.1E-05 
  11   Catastrophic rupture   3.2E-06 
THT pipeline 
  12   10% diameter leakage   4.8E-05 
  13   20% diameter leakage   2.5E-05 
  14   Full bore rupture   1.2E-06 
Pump 
  15   10% diameter leakage   1.5E-05 
  16   20% diameter leakage   7.8E-06 
  17   Full bore rupture   1.7E-06 
Boiler 
  18   10% diameter leakage   1E-05 
  19   20% diameter leakage   5.2E-06 
  20   Full bore rupture   2.6E-07 
Water pipe 
  21   10% diameter leakage   6.5E-05 
  22   20% diameter leakage   3.4E-05 
  23   Full bore rupture   1.7E-06 
 
To determine the consequences arising from a certain loss of containment an ET is built for each 
reference scenario. The ETs are required for a deeper understanding of the hazardous events and its 
most relevant outcomes. To perform this step ARAMIS’ procedure is adopted, accordingly the 
development of each ET is led by the risk properties of the related hazardous substance and its phase. 
For instance, flammable and toxic properties are associated to the THT, which is stored in liquid 
phase.  Consequently, a leakage or a catastrophic rupture involving the odorizer may result in a pool 
formation that could eventually take fire other than provoking environmental damage and pollution. 
On the other side methane, which is also known as a toxic and flammable substance, is handled in 
gas state. As a result, a catastrophic rupture (instantaneous release) of any component that processes 
methane leads to a gas puff, while a gas jet is generated by a leakage. Besides in case of immediate 
ignition the gas jet will be ignited, otherwise with delayed ignition a Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
or a Flash Fire might take place depending on the congestion of the released mass. The ET built for 
the catastrophic rupture of the pressure regulator is illustrated in Fig. 7 as an example.   
 
Fig. 7. Developed ET for the catastrophic rupture of the pressure regulator 
In accordance with the approach presented by Fig. 3weather parameters are gathered. Two weather 
conditions (June and December) are considered for this study and their summarised information are 
listed in Table 8. Another pivotal input related to the weather condition and required particularly by 
the dispersion model is represented by the probabilities of wind direction (Fig. 8). 
Table 8 
Most relevant atmospheric parameters for June and December 
Atmospheric 
parameter   June   December 
Wind speed [m/s]   3   2.06 
Temperature [°C]   27   9 
Relative Humidity   68%   78% 
Incoming radiation   Strong   Slightly 
Pasquill stability   A   C 
 
 
Fig. 8 Probability distribution of wind directions in June (left) and December (right) 
Data regarding population are also required by the software to implement the risk analysis. The 
considered NGRMS is located in a suburban area of Sesto Fiorentino, a town near Florence. Because 
of the presence of two industrial plants and some agricultural sheds, approximately 80 people are 
assumed to be in the vicinity of the hazardous installation.  
At last the harm criteria needed to calculate the risk integral percentage are chosen. Four different 
thermal radiation for jet fire, fireball and pool fire were considered: 1.6, 4, 12.5 and 37.5 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄ . 
Regarding the flash fire the population inside the Lower Flammability Level (LFL) will die with 
100% probability due to direct contact with the flames, while people situated in ½ LFL will suffer 
only inhalation effect. Four levels of overpressure were chosen to evaluate the impact of the VCE. 
The adopted evaluation criteria are illustrated by Table 9.  
Table 9 
Adopted harm criteria for the implementation of the QRA 
Incident outcome   Criteria   Damage   Fatality 
Flash Fire   LFL   Imminent Death   100% 
    1/2LFL   Inhalation Effect   0 
Pool fire, Fireball, Jet 
Fire  1.6 (kW/m2)   
Safe distance 
  0 
    4 (kW/m2)   Second degree burn   1% 
    12.5 (kW/m2) Melting of plastic tubing   10% 
    36 (kW/m2)   Damage to process equipment, death   100% 
VCE   0.0103 bar   Glass shatter   0% 
    0.02068 bar   Safe distance   0% 
    0.1379 bar   Partial collapse of roof and houses   5% 
    0.2068 bar   Serious injury, Fathality   100% 
 
After inserting all the required data into Safeti the simulation is run and subsequently useful 
information for the design or the revamping of the plant are provided by the software. Considering as 
an example the tenth scenario (i.e. 50mm leakage for the THT tank) some results will be discussed. 
The calculation revealed that in case of late pool fire, which assumes the largest pool diameter, the 
maximum peak of the radiation is 80𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  and it occurs during December at a downwind distance 
between 20m and 30m. The maximum radiation level is a little bit lower in June and it is recorded 
between 32m and 40m. For both months the radiation level falls to 0 after 70m. The variation of the 
radiation level with the distance is illustrated in Fig. 9. 
Fig. 10 represents the iso-intensity level contours of the radiation both downwind and cross wind for 
a late pool fire in June. The lethality area (inside 37.5𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  iso intensity contour) is situated 
between 30m and 45m in downwind direction, while the safe area (outside 1.6 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  iso intensity 
contour) begins after more than 70m downwind. Unprotected people who reside in the zone between 
1.6𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄   and 4 
𝑘𝑊
𝑚2⁄  are expected to suffer from second degree burn.  
 
Fig. 9. Radiation level of a late pool fire generated by a 50mm leakage from the THT tank 
 
Fig. 10 Iso-intensity curves of a late pool fire generated by a 50mm leakage from the THT tank 
Scrutinizing the outcomes of the overpressure generated by a VCE in the worst-case scenario depicted 
that the lethality overpressure (0.2068bar) is not reached in June (Fig. 11). On the other side the minor 
injury curve (0.1379bar iso-overpressure contour) is limited to a small area, while the safe distance 
(0.02068bar iso-overpressure contour) begins slightly before 100m downwind and 80m crosswind. 
The safe distance is slightly different between June and December as reported by Table 10. In June a 
person is indeed regarded as safe in a location 98m far from the hazardous installation, while for 
December the safe distance is about 10m shorter. The first value is more restrictive, therefore it must 
be adopted when new facilities or houses are built. In both weather conditions buildings situated 30m 
far from the plant could suffer serious damages, while people could get injured, with a slightly 
probability of death equal to 5%. 
 
Fig. 11 Iso-overpressure curves of the worst-case scenario explosion generated by a 50mm leakage from the THT tank 
Table 10 
Location from the installation where the reference overpressures are reached for June and December 
      Weather 
      June   December 
      Damage distance[m] 
Overpressure[bar] 
  0.0103 177   155 
  0.02068 98   87 
  0.1379 31   29 
  0.2068 Not reachable   Not Reachable 
 
To highlight the most critical components, whose maintenance must be a priority, the risk integral 
percentage os adopted as a driver. Once the aforementioned risk metric has been calculated via Safeti 
for each loss of containment, the risk integral percentage of a certain component is obtained by 
summing up the risk integral percentages of the related scenarios. Based on the estimated risk integral 
percentage the devices are ranked as showed by Table 11. 
Table 11 
Ranking based on the risk integral percentage obtained via the Safeti methodology 
Ranking   Component   Risk integral percentage  
1   Filter   77.57 
2   Pressure Regulator   11.48 
3   THT tank   9.49 
4   THT pipe   1.45 
5   Water pipe   0 
5   Pump    0 
5   Boiler   0 
 
With a striking difference of the risk integral percentage the filter is evaluated as the most critical 
component, followed by the pressure regulator with an estimated risk integral percentage of 11.48. 
Accordingly, the most critical group is the pressure regulation group, since its two components are 
the most critical ones, thus their maintenance has the priority. On the opposite side the pre-heating 
devices are the less critical with a null risk integral, indeed leakage or catastrophic rupture provoke 
slightly burn in the worst-case scenario. The odorization group is the second most critical unit, with 
THT tank as the component characterized by the highest risk integral percentage.  
3.3 RBI plan with Synergi Plant 
Table 12 shows the components considered for the third technique along with their respective cost 
data, provided by expert judgment. The outage cost denotes the cost arising from the nonworking 
component, while the environmental clean-up cost refers to the cost sustained by the company for 
erasing the pollution after a leakage. The THT tank and the THT pipelines are characterized by the 
highest environmental clean-up cost because a loss of containment could plague a huge area. On the 
other side the water components have a null environmental clean-up cost, indeed water escapes do 
not require any special procedure. The outage cost is higher for the odorizer unit rather than the 
methane group. The Filter, the THT tank and the THT pipelines have the same worst-case equipment 
damage cost of 1,500,000€, which represents the plant cost, indeed as a consequence of leakage or a 
catastrophic rupture, all plant could get engulfed in an explosion and therefore destroyed. Another 
cost required by the software is the death/injury cost, which is assumed equal to 10,000,000€. At last 
the equipment costs are needed to perform the analysis. The data illustrated by Table 13 reveal that 
the devices of the methane unit are twice and third time more expensive than the odorization and 
water components respectively. 
Table 12 
Outage cost, environmental clean-up cost and worst-case equipment damage for the considered NGRMS’ components 
Component   Outage cost 
[$/h] 
  Environmental clean-up cost 
[$/m^3]  
  Worst-case equipment 
damage [$] 
Filter   5,000   1,000   1,500,000 
THT tank   10,000   10,000   1,500,000 
THT pipelines   10,000   1,0000   1,500,000 
Pump   2,000   0   10.000 
Boiler   2,000   0   10.000 
Water pipe   2,000   0   8.000 
 
Table 13 
Equipment cost of methane, water and odorization unit 
Unit   Equipment cost[$/m^2] 
Methane   10,000 
Odorization   5,000 
Water   3,000 
 
To conduct the analysis three reference dates are set: i) the service start date, ii) the current evaluation 
date and iii) the future evaluation date. For this study the service start date is fixed at 01/01/2016, 
while the current evaluation date is 6 years later and finally the 07/11/2041 is chosen as the future 
evaluation date.  
The likelihood of the reference scenarios (small, medium, large leakage and rupture) are determined 
by the software following the API-BRD 581 standards, while the consequences are evaluated with a 
semiquantitative approach characterized by the combination of three factors: i) material escape, ii) 
personnel injury and iii) business impact. Considering the filter as an example, some relevant outputs 
produced by the software at this stage are illustrated by Table 14. The outage time, the outage cost, 
the equipment damage cost and the safety cost are provided for four different scenarios. The analysis 
depicted that the outage time for a small hole is two days, while eight days more are required to repair 
a medium hole. Twelve days is instead the downtime period for a large hole or a catastrophic rupture. 
The outage cost represents the major cost item, indeed methane is quite volatile, thus the 
environmental impact is usually low unless the gas gets ignited. Considering the safety cost the 
company is estimated to sustain an expense of 5,000$ in case of a small hole, while a catastrophic 
rupture or a large leakage generate a financial outlay of 175,000$.  
Table 14 
Outage time, outage cost, equipment damage cost and safety cost for the filter 
Hole Size Outage time 
[day] 
  Outage cost [$]   Equipment damage cost 
[$] 
  Safety cost [$]   Total cost [$] 
Small Hole 1.99   239,389   24,581   4,805   268,776 
Medium 
Hole 
10.23   1,227,821   401,470   87,221   1,759,338 
 Large Hole 14   1,680,681   686,435   174,789   2,656,974 
Rupture 14.08   1,689,264   692,435   174,789   2,672,982 
 
The choice of a risk metric along with a risk threshold is required to develop a RBI plan. The Risk 
Total Cost (RTC) is adopted as a driver and its maximum tolerable value is set at 20,000$/AvegYear. 
For scheduling the inspections, the width is chosen as the parameter to be monitored, while the 
external corrosion is considered as damage mechanism. The components are made out of carbon steel, 
in particular pipes are made of API 5L GR B. THT pipeline has a 2.9mm width, while the inlet pipe 
of the filter is characterized by a width of 3.2mm. The THT tank is a horizontal cylinder with 1400mm 
length and 690mm diameter while its width is 3mm. The corrosion allowance is assumed equal to 
1.5mm [57] while the corrosion rate calculated by the software is adopted.  
Once the required data are inserted into Synergi Plant the inspection plan is obtained, then the 
components are ranked based on their respective inspection date as showed by Table 15. The software 
calculates also the Current Risk Total Cost (CRTC), which is evaluated in the current date, the Future 
Risk Total Cost With Inspection (FRTC W.I.), estimated in the future evaluation date considering the 
inspection plan, and the Future Risk Total Cost Without Inspection (FRTC WO.I.), which refers to 
the same date as the previous cost, but without taking into account the inspections planned. The CRTC 
is influenced by the timespan between the service start date and the current evaluation date, while the 
FRTC W.I. and FRTC WO.I. are driven by the future evaluation date and the potential inspections 
between the current and the future evaluation day. 
Table 15 
Ranking obtained via Synergi Plant approach and CRTC, FRTC W.I. and FRTC WO.I. calculated for each component 







FRTC W. I. 
[$/AvegYear] 
  
FRTC WO. I. 
[$/AvegYear] 
Filter   1   23/01/2025   564   20,920   134,927 
THT pipeline 2   24/07/2025   701   16,211   81,298 
THT tank   3   14/01/2027   550   39,372   892,621 
Boiler   4   16/10/2050   652   15,668   15,668 
Water pipe   5   16/10/2050   652   15,668   15,668 
Pump   6   16/10/2050   652   15,668   15,668 
 
The calculation highlighted that the most critical component is the filter, whose inspection is 
scheduled on January 23rd, 2025. The inspection allows to reduce the FRTC from 135,000$/AvegYear 
to 20,000$/AvegYear. The inspection of the THT pipeline is planned for July 24th, 2025, while THT 
tank will be inspected almost a year and a half later. The THT tank is also characterized by the highest 
difference between the FRTC WO. I. and the FRTC W. I., while about 65,000$/AvegYear is the gap 
between the two costs for the filter. The risk target of 20,000$/AvegYear is never reached for the pre-
heating devices, therefore the lowest priority is assigned to their inspections.  
4. Results and discussion 
By comparing the rankings obtained by the three approaches some differences stand out. The THT 
tank and the THT pipeline are considered the most critical components for the method based on the 
HBM, moreover both the boiler and the water pipe have priority over the pressure regulation devices. 
By contrast, the pre-heating apparatus is established as the least critical unit by both the QRA and the 
RBI. The last two techniques also highlighted the filter as the most critical component, while they 
rank the THT tank and the THT pipeline on inverted positions.   
Even if the approaches were applied to the same plant some differences emerged due to the different 
sensitivities of the methodologies. Accurate probabilities of failure are used by the first method, while 
the severity is assessed via a semi-quantitative approach. Besides the total cost of failure is considered 
for the analysis. On the other side standard frequencies (which are less accurate than the previous 
ones) are adopted for the second technique, which provides more precise results regarding the 
consequences. In addition to that no cost data are considered by Safeti, indeed only the potential 
damages to the people and the environment are evaluated by the software. At last frequencies from 
API standards are exploited during the third methodology, while a semi-quantitative approach is used 
for assessing the consequences. Furthermore, many cost items are specified for the method based on 
Synergi Plant. 
4.1 CRPN method sensitivity analysis 
The first proposed methodology is very sensitive to variation of the adopted costs. For instance, 
instead of considering the total cost of failure, the cost of the component plus the cost of maintenance 
could be adopted. Transforming the costs into dimensionless values through the estimated pump cost 
of 1,000€, the ranking showed by Table 16 is obtained. The levels of occurrence and severity are 
given for each component by Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.  
 
Table 16 
Ranking obtained via the CRPN methodology after changing the cost data 
Ranking   Component   O   S   C   CRPN  
1   THT tank   4   9   3   108 
2   Boiler   5   5   3   75 
3   Pressure Regulator   2   9   4   72 
4   Filter   4   9   2   72 
5   RCS   5   6   2   60 
6   THT pipelines   2   9   3   54 
7   Water pipe   8   2   2   32 
8   Meter   3   3   2   18 
9   Pilot   1   8   2   16 
10   Calculator   5   3   1   15 
11   Pump   5   3   1   15 
12   PTG   6   2   1   12 
 
The THT tank is still regarded as the most critical device with a CRPN equal to 108, however the 
THT pipelines dropped from the second place to the sixth. The boiler climbed one position, ending 
up in third place. The greatest jump is registered for the pressure regulator, which passed from being 
the seventh most critical components to being the third most critical one.  
The results are also affected by changes of the adopted severity and occurrence categories. As an 
example, Table 17 and Table 18 are used to assign to each component a class of occurrence and 
severity respectively.  Accordingly, the ranking illustrated by Table 19 is found. 
Table 17 
New occurrence criteria ranking 
Occurrence Occurrence probability   Component 
1   <1 in 30,000   Pilot 
2   1 in 10,000   
Pressure regulator, THT pipe, meter, Filter, THT 
tank 
3   1 in 3000   RCS, calculator, boiler, pump, water pipe 
4   1 in 2000     
5   1 in 1000   PTG 
 
Table 18 
New severity criteria ranking 
Severity   Severity of effect   Component 
1   No effect     
2   Minor effect   Water pipe, PTG, pump, meter, calculator 
3   Moderate effect    Boiler, RCS 
4   Major effect   Pilot 
5   Catastrophic effect   THT tank, THT pipelines, Pressure regulator, Filter 
 
Table 19 
Ranking obtained via the CRPN method after changing the occurrence and severity criteria 
Ranking   Component   Occurrence Severity   Cost    C-RPN  
1   Pressure Regulator   2   5   4   40 
2   THT tank   2   5   3   30 
3   THT pipelines   2   5   3   30 
4   Boiler   3   3   3   27 
5   Filter   2   5   2   20 
6   RCS   3   3   2   18 
7   Pump   3   5   1   15 
8   Water pipe   3   2   2   12 
9   PTG   5   2   1   10 
10   Pilot   1   4   2   8 
11   Meter   2   2   2   8 
12   Calculator   3   2   1   6 
 
The pressure regulator emerged as the most critical equipment, followed by the THT tank and the 
THT pipeline. With respect to the first ranking, the filter has acquired a relevant spot, while the RCS 
is deprioritised.  
4.2 Safeti-QRA sensitivity analysis 
The consequence analysis performed by Safeti is really accurate, however the obtained ranking is 
deeply influenced by the adopted standard frequencies. Changing the input frequencies causes indeed 
a variation of the calculated risk integral percentages on which the ranking is based. To demonstrate 
the last statement a FT is developed for the small leakage of each component. The FT of the small 
leakage for a pressure regulator is showed by Fig. 12 and Fig 13, while the considered events are 
listed in Table 20.  
 
Fig. 12. Adopted FT for the small leakage of the pressure regulator 
 
Fig. 13. Macro-events of the FT showed in Fig. 12 
 
Table 20 
Considered events for the FT of the pressure regulator small leakage 
# Event 
X1 Material defect 
X2 Aging 
X3 Lacking or defective maintenance 
X4 Intentional error during operation 
X5 Failure of coating 
X6 Extremely bad quality of inlet gas 
X7 Wearing 
X8 Bad interpretation of signal (mistake) 
X9 Higher pressure of the upstream flow 
X10 Improper equipment 
X11 Construction defect 
X12 Inadequate training 
X13 Inadequate experience 
X14 Blockage of pipes 
X15 Poor assembling 
 
Adopting the FTs, the probabilities found in literature [58, 59] illustrated by Table 21 and considering 
the results of the HBM for the seal and junction joint annual probability of failure, the small leakage 
frequencies listed in Table 22 are calculated. Using the aforementioned frequencies for the QRA 
produces a different ranking (Table 23) compared to the previous one. 
Table 21 
Annual probabilities of the FT’s basic events 
Event   Probability (annual) 
Intentional error (X4)   0.0001 
Improper equipment (X10)  0.003 
Inadequate training (X12)   0.0004  
Inadequate experience (X13)   0.0001 
Blockage of pipes (X14)   0.028 
Valves activation  0.003 
 
Table 22 
New calculated frequencies via FT analysis for the small leakage of each considered component 
Scenario   Frequency [event/year] 
THT tank small leak   0.079 
Pressure Regulator small leak   0.082 
Filter small leak   0.071 
THT pipeline small leak   0.064 
 
Table 23 
Ranking obtained via Safeti after changing the input frequencies 
Ranking   Component   Risk integral percentage  
1   Pressure Regulator   39.70 
2   Filter   33.92 
3   THT tank   20.14 
4   THT pipeline   5.77 
5   Water pipe   0 
5   Pump    0 
5   Boiler   0 
 
The calculation depicted that the most critical component is the pressure regulator, with a risk integral 
percentage equal to 39.70. On the other side the filter has fallen from the first place to the second one, 
with an estimated 40 points reduction of the risk metric. Despite this the pressure reduction unit is 
still evaluated as the most compelling group due to its global risk integral percentage of 67.62. At last 
the third and fourth highest risk values are associated to the THT tank and the THT pipeline 
respectively.  
4.3 Synergi Plant-RBI sensitivity analysis 
During the presentation of the method, one risk target and one future evaluation date are adopted to 
produce the criticality ranking. Nevertheless, different strategies could be used to pinpoint the most 
critical components. For instance, considering three future evaluation dates, the trend of the FRTC 
WO. I. could be studied to determine the devices whose maintenance is a priority. Table 24 and Fig. 
14 illustrate the results of the analysis.  
Table 24 
Variation of the FRTC WO. I. for different future evaluation dates 
Component   07/11/2021   07/11/2026   07/11/2031 
THT tank   512   17,065   295,490 
THT pipeline   536   26,345   44,274 
Boiler   50   4,568   7,780 
Water pipe   50   4,568   7,780 
Pump   50   4,568   7,780 
Filter   434   39,339   66,991 
 
 
Fig. 14. Trend of the FRTC for each component (Y axis). The X axis is expressed in months 
Based on the FRTC WO.I. trend the THT tank is regarded as the most critical component, indeed its 
risk experiences the greatest increase. Moving from the 7th November, 2026 to 7th November, 2031, 
its FRTC WO.I. raises from 17,065$/AvegYear to almost 300,000$/AvegYear. As a result, the THT 
tank must be monitored and inspected continuously to avoid big losses and immoderate risk. The 
remaining components are characterized by an increasing trend too, but their FRTC WO.I. variations 
are smaller. The FRTC WO. I. of the filter and the THT pipeline are similar on the 7th November, 
2021, but on the 7th November, 2031 the FRTC WO.I. calculated for the filter is about 
20,000$/AvegYear higher than the value associated to the THT pipeline. At last the pre-Heating 
group components are the less critical ones, indeed they have the lowest FRTC WO.I. with a 
maximum value of about 8,000$/AvegYear on the 7th November 2031. 
Varying the risk threshold may also affect the ranking. Considering five levels of risk target, the 
obtained results are showed by Table 25 and Fig. 16. 
Table 25 
Variation of the inspection date expressed in months for different risk threshold values 
  Risk Target [$/AvegYear] 
Component  10,000  20,000  30,000  40,000  50,000 
THT tank  123  132  140  144  148 
THT pipeline  97  114  144  180  203 
Boiler  217  405  577  1,188  1,188 
Water pipe  217  405  577  1,188  1,188 
Pump  217  405  577  1,188  1,188 
Filter  97  108  118  132  150 
 
 
Fig. 15. Trend of the inspection date (months) for different risk threshold values (X-axis). 
The pump, the boiler and the water pipe are characterized by the longest inspection interval for each 
category of the risk target. If the company accepts high level of risk (40,000$/AvegYear or 
50,000$/AvegYear) the inspection of the water components is planned for January 2115, otherwise if 
the enterprise is highly risk adverse the inspection task is performed earlier: on the 16th October, 2050 
if the threshold is set at 20,000$/AvegYear or on the 11th February 2064 with a considered risk target 
of 30,000$/AvegYear. The filter is the first component to be inspected for a risk target from 
10,000$/AvegYear to 40,000$/AvegYear, however adopting a threshold value of 50,000$/AvegYear 
gives priority to the THT tank with an inspection planned approximately two months earlier than the 
filter. Depending on the adopted risk target, the inspection plan is significantly different, indeed using 
the first value of the metric, the THT tank would be inspected 2 years later compared to the filter and 
the THT tank. By contrast, the THT tank inspection precedes the THT pipe inspection for a risk target 
of 30,000$/AvegYear and the inspection of the filter when 50,000$/AvegYear is adopted as maximum 
tolerable risk.  
5. Conclusions 
This work presents a comparative study of three different RBM techniques. These approaches are 
able to generate a criticality ranking, highlighting the most critical devices towards which 
maintenance efforts should be directed.  NGRMS was chosen as case of study to illustrate the three 
frameworks, while underlining their advantages and limitations. In the first methodology HBM was 
adopted to estimate the likelihood of occurrence, while a FMECA was used to evaluate the 
consequences arising from potential failures. After introducing the total cost of failure the CRPN is 
calculated for each component. For the second methodology a software named Safeti is adopted to 
conduct a QRA. Through the calculation of the software the devices are ranked based on their 
respective risk integral percentage. At last the third method consists in a RBI, exploiting a software 
named Synergi Plant.  The C-RPN method is characterized by a weak semi-quantitative consequence 
analysis. Besides, the accurate approach used to calculate the failure probabilities is degraded with 
the discretization of the occurrence. By contrast, the QRA via Safeti is accurate in performing 
consequence analysis, but it is very sensitive to variation of the input frequencies and finally the RBI 
plan obtained through Synergi Plant is influenced by the uncertainties of costs and company policies. 
The last method is therefore suggested to be applied when costs data and enterprise policies are well 
defined and precise. The Safeti analysis is the best way to perform RBM when accurate frequencies 
are available and at last the C-RPN method can be adopted for screening analysis because of its 
sensitivity to user choices. Further development could exploit the HBM as long with precursor data 
to calculate precise probabilities of the reference scenarios, which could then be used to perform the 
QRA via Safeti.  
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